Subprime Auto Loan Outcomes by Lender Type

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Introduction

- Americans owe auto lenders well over \$1 trillion.
- Auto loans common among borrowers with subprime scores.
 - High interest rates
 - High default rates

Variation across lender types in interest & default rates.

Question:

How much of variation in interest rates is explained by variation in default rates?



Types of auto lenders

- 1. Banks
- 2. Credit unions
- 3. Captives
- 4. Finance companies
- 5. Buy-Here-Pay-Here ("BHPH")



Autocount:

- Merged credit record & DMV data
- Origination data only

<u>CCP:</u>

- Only credit record data
- Origination + servicing



Sample selection


- Loans originated 2014-2016
- Performance measured three years later, 2017-2019
- Focus only on "subprime", i.e. credit score < 620

Definition of default

- 60+ day delinquency
- 90+ day delinquency




Furnishing rates across lender types



Small finance & BHPH lenders furnish at very low rates → CCP data not representative



Furnished loans more creditworthy




Small Finance

Small finance & BHPH loans in CCP relatively creditworthy

CTOD Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Observables by lender type, for furnished loans



Bank -

Captive -

Credit Union -

Large Finance -

Small Finance -

Large BHPH :

Small BHPH -

Missing:

20

Loan Term in Months

80


60

-

| | Interest Rate | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---------------|----|-----|----|-----|--|--|--|
| Bank- | _ | | _ | - | | | | |
| Credit Union | | - | _ | | | | | |
| Captive | | 1 | _ | _ | | | | |
| Large Finance | | | _ | | | | | |
| Small Finance | | - | | | _ | | | |
| Large BHPH | | | | | - | | | |
| Small BHPH | _ | | _ | - | | | | |
| Missing | 1 | | - | - | 1 | | | |
| | .05 | .1 | .15 | .2 | .25 | | | |

. . .

Loan-to-Value Ratio





Bank

Captive-


Credit Union-


Large Finance -

Small Finance-


Large BHPH

Loan Amount






40



Percent for New Vehicles



Source: AutoCount



Default risk by lender type

Logit regression.


Controls:

- credit score
- age
- mortgage,
- co-borrower
- Iender type FE

Considerable variation across lender types.

But with controls, comparisons possible.

- Small BHPH vs bank
- Small finance vs large



Interest rates by lender type

OLS. Controls:

- Same as before
- & default outcome


Comparable default risk. But large differences in interest rates.

Sml BHPH \rightarrow bank

• 13 → 9% (\$894)

Sml \rightarrow Irg finance

• 18→ 13% (\$1,348)





Interest rates by lender type & default status

| Why do conditional interest rates vary? | Banks | Not Delinquent – Delinquent – | θ | -0- | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|-----|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Many potential explanations. Loss given default may be: 1. Higher 2. Lower 3. Same | Credit Unions | Not Delinquent – Delinquent – | e | | | |
| | Captives | Not Delinquent – Delinquent – | | e - 0 - | | |
| | Large Finance | Not Delinquent – Delinquent – | | e | \$ | |
| OLS as before, except FE for (lender type x delinquency). | Small Finance | Not Delinquent – Delinquent – | | | | |
| ➔ More evidence for (2) & (3) than (1). | Large BHPH | Not Delinquent – Delinquent – | | | | ÷ |
| | Small BHPH | Not Delinquent – Delinquent – | .05 | .1 | • • .15 | .2 |



Interest rates vary across lender types.

- 1. Default rates explain some of this variation.
- 2. Default rates leave much unexplained.
- 3. Some suggestive evidence on why.

Many remaining questions.

1. How can the CFPB improve market & borrower outcomes?

