Panel 6: Information and Disclosure

Melissa Knoll

CFPB Research Conference | December 16, 2016



The views expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or the United States.

Paper 1: Financial (Dis-) Information

- 3-country audit study (Ghana, Mexico, Peru)
- Trained local residents as auditors
 - Varied scripts on 4 dimensions (account type, sophistication, competition, dress code)
- Key questions:
 - What is the quality of the information provided?
 - Do financial institutions offer the best product for the customer?
- Key findings:
 - Enough info provided to open account/apply for loan, but little voluntary disclosure of cost
 - Auditors rarely offered the cheapest product
- "...staff only provides information when prompted..."
- "...financial institutions do not engage in informative marketing."



Paper 3: The Display of Information and Household Investment Behavior

- Retirement/mutual fund market in Israel
- Exploits natural experiment from regulatory change (regression discontinuity)
 - Change from 1-month return display to 12-month return display
 - 12-month display became default
- Key findings:
 - **Sensitivity to 1-month returns decreased after display shock**
 - Decline in overall trade volume after display shock
 - Net flows into riskier accounts increased after display shock
- "...regulators may be granting power to disclosing entities unintentionally."



Paper 2: Attention, Search and Switching

- 5 RCTs using regulated financial institutions in the UK
- Tested interventions to encourage switching to higher-paying savings products
- Some interventions were effective (all modest effects)
 - $_{
 m o}$ front-page switching box \checkmark
 - \square reverse-page switching box \checkmark
 - \Box switching form \checkmark
 - $_{
 m D}$ Digital/SMS reminders \checkmark
- Some evidence for heterogeneous effects
 - Switching level in control groups higher for those with more to gain
 - □ Switching level in control groups higher for those aged 60+ (retired)
- "...attention to disclosure is low"



What is known vs. What is knowable

- Paper 1: All of the information is *knowable*, only information explicitly requested is *known*
 - Naïve auditors don't ask, sophisticated auditors do
- Paper 3: 1-month information is *knowable*, only 12-month information is *known*
 - (I argue) Less-sophisticated investors would have a hard time figuring out 1-month return
- Paper 2: Info on reverse-page switching box is *knowable*, info on first-page switching box is *known* (somewhat)
 - Scarcity? Sophistication?
 - Bigger question: How much is known at all on average?
 - Limited attention to disclosures in general



Information Disparities

- Can choice architecture lead to information disparities between more- and less-sophisticated consumers?
 - In all papers the information is *knowable*, but are less-sophisticated consumers less likely to *know*?
 - Unintended consequences of disclosures?
- Libertarian paternalism
 - "...it is both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also respecting freedom of choice (Thaler, 2003)"
 - Is respect for freedom of choice enough?
 - Should we pay more attention to who is likely/able to exercise choice?



Topics for Future Research

- Heterogeneous nudges?
 - Perhaps shift away from blunt nudges toward customizable choice architecture
- Knowable vs. known
 - Do consumers seek out additional information?
 - Disclosures with links to additional information
 - Are some consumers more likely to seek out information than others?
 - Potential for information disparities based on ???
- Context of information provision
 - Interactions between customer and institution that could lead to less attention, engagement, less comprehension



Monthly fee F \$5.99[†]

Per purchase

ATM withdrawal **\$0** in-network

\$1.99 out-of-network

Cash reload \$3.99*

all

+	
ATM balance inquiry (in-network or out-of-network)	\$0 or \$0.50
Customer service (automated or live agent)	\$0 or \$0.50* perca
Inactivity (after 12 months with no transactions)	\$1.00 per month

We charge 4 other types of fees. Here are some of them:

[Additional fee type]	\$0.50 or \$1.00
[Additional fee type]	\$3.00

⁺ No monthly fee with direct deposit or 30 transactions per month.

* This fee can be lower depending on how and where this card is used.

You may be offered overdraft/credit after 30 days. Fees would apply. Register your card for FDIC insurance eligibility and other protections.

For general information about prepaid accounts, visit *cfpb.gov/prepaid*. Find details and conditions for all fees and services inside the package, or call **800-234-5678** or visit *xyz.com/prepald*.

